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Generalizing from Facts in Predicting
Court Cases
STUART S. NAGEL*

The purpose of this article is to describe a prediction system called
"generalizing from facts" that is especially applicable to lawyers seeking
to predict case outcomes. It is easier to understand generalizing from
facts through concrete examples, rather than abstract principles. This
article presents three such examples covering (1) a criminal case with
two conflicting witnesses, (2) a civil case with conflicting lawyer perceptions, and (3) an international law ease with multiple facts and weights.
I.

A CRnIM AL CASE wim Two CoNrnicmo WrrNEssEs

Table 1 provides an example of synthesizing a set of facts in a trial
decision using the P/Glo software. 1 This is a criminal case in Which the
key question is whether the defendant is guilty or not. For the sake of
simplicity, there are two pieces of evidence. One is the testimony of a
defense witness who offers an alibi for the defendant. That witness has
an eighty percent probability of telling the truth, which would favor the
defendant being found not guilty. The second piece of evidence is the
testimony of a prosecution witness who claims to have seen the defendant at the scene of the crime. There is a seventy percent probability
that the witness is telling the truth when one simply analyzes that witness
alone without considering the testimony of related witnesses.
Not all witnesses or pieces of evidence are of equal importance.
An alibi witness is typically more important than a witness who saw the
defendant at the scene of the crime. If the alibi witness is telling the
truth, then the defendant cannot be guilty. If the crime-scene witness is
telling the truth, then the defendant could still be innocent, since being
*

Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-

Champaign.
1. On the general literature of decision-aiding software, see P. HUMPmEYs & A.
WisuDHA, METHODS AND TOOLS FOR STRUCTURING A AALYZINo DECISION PROBLEMS

(1987). On the literature that deals with multi-criteria decision-making, see C. HWANG

& K. YOON, MULTIPLE ATTRBuTE DECISION MAKING: METHODS AND APPLICATIONS
(1981). For further details on the P/G% decision-aiding software which is based on
MCDM thinking in a spreadsheet format, see S. NAGEL, EVALUATiON ANALYSIS wrrT
MICROCOMPUTERS (1989).
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at the scene of the crime does not mean that the defendant was
necessarily the perpetrator. Therefore, the alibi statement is assigned a
weight or a multiplier of two.
The synthesis then involves adding .40 to .70 to obtain a weighted
sum for the alternative that the defendant is not guilty. Those two
weighted sums should then be divided by the sum of the weights (which
are two and one) to obtain probabilities that add to 1.00. The bottom
line shows there is a .37 probability that the defendant is guilty in light
of the analysis and a .63 probability that the defendant is not guilty. It
would therefore be appropriate to acquit the defendant since the probability of guilt should be higher than about .90 in order to justify a
conviction.
TABLE 1. DEFIRMNING TW PROBABIIrY OF GUILT
Criteria

(1)

(2)

Defese Statemnt Prosecution Stament (Scene of

Altematives

W = 2

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

SUM

SUM
N

Weighted Sum

Wighted Sum
Sum of Weights

(3)/2

(.5)+(2)

(5)/3

.45

1.10

.37

W= 1

(1)+(2M)
.90

Defedant is Gilty .20

(.40)

.70

Defendant is not .80

(

.30

1.10

.55

1.90

.63

(2.00)

1.00

2.00

1.00

3.0

1.00

1.00
NOTES:

1. The numbers in columns I and 2 are probabilities. They indicate the degree of accuracy or truth associated with the
statements in the direction of establishing the defendant's guilt. Thus, the .20 probability means that there is a .80
probability that the defense statement is true, and the .20 complement is in the direction of establishing the defendant's
guilt. These are probabilities of truth, not probabilities of guilt.
2. The weights indicate the degree of importance of the evidence items. Thus an alibi statement is quite important (if true) in
establishing innocence. A statement saying the defendant was at the scene of the crime is less important because even if it
is true, it does not establish the defendant's guilt. The numbers in parentheses in column I are weighted probabilities.
3. The numbers in column 3 are the sum of the two unweighted probabilities. The numbers in column 5 are the sums of the
two weighted probabilities.
4. The numbers in column 4 are unweighted average probabilities. The numbers in column 5 are weighted average probabilities.
The numbers in column 6 are an approximation of Bayesian conditional probabilities especially when one only has
probabilities of truthfulness and degrees of importance to work with.
5. If the probability in the upper right hand corner is greater than .90, then the judge, juror, or other perceiver of these two
items of evidence should vote to convict assuming (1) .90 is accepted as the threshold probability interpretation of beyond
a reasonable doubt, and (2) these are the only items of evidence. If the starred probability is .90 or less, then one should
vote to acquit.
6. With two alibi witnesses, each might receive a weight of 1.5 if one witness receives a 2. They do not both receive a 2
because they partly reinforce each
other.
7. No set of weights will cause the weighted average to exceed .90 with probabilities of .20 and .70. Thus, there is no threshold
value for either WI or W2.
8. The difficulty of obtaining a set of evidence items across the prosecution and the defense that average better than a .90
probability may indicate that jurors and judges generally operate below the .90 threshold, even though judges and
commentators say that .90 is roughly the probability translation of "beyond a reasonable doubt".
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Studies on determining the probability of guilt or liability deal
with how people ought to or do determine probabilities. There is an
approximate consensus that people do not explicitly or implicitly use
Bayesian probability calculations. 2 Such calculations are too complicated, and information is not available on how each item of evidence
relates to each other item of evidence, as well as how each item of
evidence relates to the defendant being guilty. The complications are
especially great when there are more than two items of evidence.
Table 1 does not explicitly deal with the relation between each
item of evidence and the probability of guilt. Instead, it deals with
the easier matter of the probability that the evidence is accurate on
the point it is making. The weights of each item of evidence mainly
take into consideration how strongly the evidence relates to establishing guilt. The weights are relative weights which are easier concepts
to understand than probabilities. The weights also account for the
overlap between items of evidence. If two items of evidence are
completely redundant, then they each would receive half the weight
which each alone would otherwise receive. Table 3 purports to roughly
approximate how jurors implicitly synthesize facts, and it implicitly
recommends this weighted summation method as a meaningful and
feasible approach to synthesizing facts.3
II.
A.

A CIviL

CASE WITH CONFLICTING OPINIONS

DETERMINING THE PROBABILITY OF LIABILITY BEING
ESTABLISHED

Table 2 shows the P/G% analysis that was actually used in a
product liability case in the federal district court of the Northern
District of Illinois. The case involved a United States insurance
company suing a foreign electronics manufacturer for damages which
allegedly occurred as a result of an appliance catching fire. The fire
2. For references to Bayesian probability, see infra notes 5 and 14.
3. On the systematic synthesizing of facts in trial decisions to arrive at a
probability of guilt or liability, see Kingston, Probability and Legal Proceedings, 57 J.
C"s. L., CRIMINowGY & POL. Sci. 93, 93-98 (1966); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75
MICH. L. REv., 1021 (1977); P. LINDsEY & D. NORMAN, HuMAN INFORMATION PROCESSWNO 549-56 (1972); Kaplan & Kemmerick, JurorJudgment as Information Integration:
Combining Evidentialand Nonevidential Information, J. PERSONAUTY & Soc. PSYCHOLoay 493-99 (1974); and Schum, Contrast Effects in Inference: On the Conditioning of
Current Evidence by Prior Evidence, 18 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN
PERFORMANCE 217 (1977).
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caused approximately $950,000 in damages to a restaurant and other
business establishments that were insured by the United States insurance company and other insurance companies. They had already paid
the injured parties, and they were now seeking to be reimbursed from
the foreign manufacturer.
TABLE 2. DETERMINING LABILITY IN A CIVIL CASE
A. THE PREDICTIVE CRITERIA
CRITERIA

MEAS. UNIT

WEIGHT

I P's Prediction
2 D's Prediction
3 Combustible?
4 No Break Circuit?
5 Prior Occurrence?

Prob. Win
"

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
2.00

''

"
"

B. THE PROBABILITY OF LIABILITY IF EACH PREDICTIVE CRITERION WERE THE ONLY ONE
ALTERNATIVES

CRITERIA

D Liable (Pro P)
No Liable (Pro D)

P's Prediction

D's Prediction

Combustible?

No Break

Prior Occurrence

0.70
0.30

0.10
0.90

0.40
0.60

0.40
0.60

0.30
0.70

C. COMBINING THE PROBABILITIES ON THE PREDICTING CRITERIA
ALTERNATIVES
I D Liable (Pro P)
2 No Liable (Pro D)

COMBINED
WTD. P/W%'s

PERCENTS

220.00
380.00

36.67
63.33

A key issue in this case and a high percentage of civil cases was
whether liability could be established. There are basically two alternative positions that a court could take on this issue as is shown in
the alternatives column, section B of Table 2. Either the defendant
will be found liable, which is a decision that favors the plaintiff, or
the defendant will be found not liable, which is a decision that favors
the defendant.
Five predictive criteria are shown in section A of the table. They
are:
1. The plaintiff's prediction as to the probability of victory. This is
shown in section B as a .70 probability that the plaintiff will win.
The plaintiff is thus predicting that there is a .30 probability the
defendant will win. Those probabilities were determined by talking
with the plaintiff's attorneys and translating their words, gestures,
and emotions into predictive probabilities.
2. The defendant's prediction as to the probability of victory. This
is shown as a .10 probability that the plaintiff will win, and
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conversely a .90 probability that the defendant will win. All the
probabilities are expressed in the top row of section B in terms
of plaintiff victory and in the bottom row in terms of defendant
victory. The defendant was more confident of victory in this case
than the plaintiff, as is indicated by comparing the .90 and the
.70 probabilities.
3. A key sub-issue or predictive criterion within the larger issue of
liability probability was a question as to whether the appliance
could be combustible, meaning whether it was capable of burning.
The plaintiff argued that it was, but the defendant argued that it
was not. Their arguments translated into a .40 probability that
the plaintiff would win, and a .60 probability that the defendant
would win on the overall liability issue if combustibility were the
only factual element. Note that the .40 factor does not indicate
there is a .40 probability that the appliance is combustible.
Instead, it indicates that if the only evidence present in this case
were combustibility evidence, then the plaintiff would have about
a .40 probability of winning the case.
4. A related sub-issue was whether the circuit breaker in the appliance might not have worked in the presence of intense heat as it
was supposed to do. The plaintiff argued that it was possible that
the electrical circuit did not immediately break as intended. The
defendant argued that the existence of such a defect was virtually
impossible. Their representative arguments led the mediator in his
analysis to say that if there were only evidence on the circuit
breaker, the plaintiff would also just have a .40 probability of
winning.
5. The last factual element or predictive criterion is the question of
whether there was a prior occurrence of this type of appliance
causing a fire. The plaintiff's lawyers argued that they were in
the process of showing that there had been a prior occurrence,
but they were reluctant to be specific in the pre-trial proceedings
claiming that they wanted to save the evidence for trial. The
defendant's lawyers argued that the company records and a
thorough search of prior court cases showed no such prior
occurrence. The plaintiff's lawyers were less convincing on this
issue than on the previous two issues of combustibility and the
circuit breaking. Thus, it was reasoned if this were the only
predictive criterion, then the plaintiff would only have a .30
probability of winning. There seemed to be a consensus, however,
that this was an especially important issue deserving more weight
than the others. The first two predictive criteria were considered
less weighty in view of the expected biases of the plaintiff's and
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defendant's predictions. The third and fourth factual elements
are not very crucial, since even if it were shown that it is physically
possible for the appliance to burn and physically possible for the
circuit not to break, such evidence would not indicate that burning
or non-breaking occurred in this instance or eve occurred in any
previous instance. However, if a pattern of previous fires from
such an appliance could be shown, that evidence would be devastating to the defendant and practically assure victory to the
plaintiff.
Section C of Table 2 shows how the probabilities of the predictive
criteria are combined. If each criterion were equally important, then
the individual probabilities, .70 + .10 + .40 + .40 + .30, are simply
added to obtain a total of 1.90. This figure is then divided by five
predictive criteria to achieve an average of .38. Therefore, if for any
one predictive criterion (such as the third) there is a .40 probability
of plaintiff victory, and if a second predictive criterion (like the
defendant's prediction) for which there is only a .10 probability of
victory is added, then it seems logical to average the two to obtain a
factor of .25. This assumes both predictions are equally important
and accurate. This process is like averaging the allocation percentages
between two different allocation criteria as in the estate allocation
example in Chapter three on "Computer-Aided Counseling." ' 4 If,
however, one criterion is approximately twice as important as the
others, then we should logically count it twice or give it a weight or
multiplier of two as with the fifth criterion. Doing so means adding
another .30 to the 1.90 and obtaining a total of 2.20. We then divide
that weighted total by the sum of the weights which is six, and obtain
a probability of .37 which is the 36.67% figure in the bottom line.'
4. See Nagel, Computer-Aided Counseling, 5 LEGAL AssisTAI' TODAY, 66-70
(March/April, 1988).
5. The traditional approach to aggregating probabilities is to use the formulas
associated with Bayesian probability calculations. These calculations are almost unbelievably complicated, especially with more than one predictive criterion. An analysis of
what these calculations require in the context of predicting case outcomes is presented
in "Alternative Predictive and Analytic Techniques Applicable to Multiple-Category

Variables" in S. NAGEL, Tim

LEGAL PRocEss FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE,

169-71

(1969), and Nagel, Lamm & Neef, Decision Theory and Juror Decision-Making, Tfi
TRiAL PROCESS 353 (B. Sales ed. 1981).
Averaging the probabilities will achieve exactly the same result as if there was only
one predictive criterion. Averaging the probabilities will also achieve approximately the
same result no matter how many predictive criteria there are if there is little overlap
among the predictive criteria or if the overlap is taken into consideration by how the
criteria are weighted. For example, if two criteria are highly redundant, then instead of
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DETERMININ4G WHAT IT WOULD TAKE TO MAKE THE LOSER THE
WINNER

One might ask, for any given predictive criterion, how the
probabilities have to change to bring the victory probability for the
plaintiff up to .50, .80, or any other probability in which one is
interested. The algebra necessary for answering that question is relatively simple and can be more explicitly programmed as part of the
P/G% threshold analysis, although that has not yet been done.
Suppose we want to know how high the plaintiff victory probability
has to go on the combustibility criterion in order to make the plaintiff
a winner given the scores and weights on the other four criteria. Being
a winner in this context means having an overall probability of more
than .50. An easy way to answer that question is by summing .70 +
.10 + X + .40 +.30 +.30 for a total of 1.80 + X. Notice that we
added the .30 twice because the fifth criterion had a weight of two.
The next step is to divide that sum by six, since the sum of the weights
is six. We then solve for X in the equation (1.80 + X)/6 = .50. The
solution is 1.80 + X = 3.00, and thus X=3.00-1.80, which is 1.20.
As an alternative to this algebraic approach, one could use a
reiterative guessing approach to arrive at the same result. Doing so
would involve proceeding as follows:
1. The initial pair of probabilities on the third criterion are .40 and
.60 factors. In order for the plaintiff to come up to a 50-50 tie
with the defendant, the .40 probability would have to be raised.
2. We might therefore try .80 and .20 as a new pair of probabilities.
We would insert them into the data matrix in place of the .40
giving each criterion a weight of 1.00, they should be given a weight of .50 apiece. If
they are mildly redundant, then .90 apiece might be appropriate. Assigning weights does
have an element of subjectivity to it, although there may be reasonable agreement among
knowledgeable people. More important, the approach of averaging weighted probabilities
is possible to do, whereas the approach of obtaining information on the degree of
overlap using the Bayesian approach is virtually impossible in any real world problem
given the Bayesian emphasis on odds, likelihood ratios, priors and conditional probabilities.
The method of predicting from facts or P/G% probability analysis may often be
superior to traditional Bayesian probability analysis because it is simpler and makes
better use of the limited information that is available. However, the method of predicting
from facts does make use of a fundamental principle of Bayesian analysis, namely that
a probability can legitimately be a kind of "gut feeling" so that probabilities of 0.00,
.25, .50, .75 and 1.00 are roughly the equivalent of attitude scores on a 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5 scale. This is in contrast to narrower notions that probabilities have to be deductive
(like the probability of two heads when flipping two coins is .25), or that they have to
be inductive (like the probability of a plaintiff winning is .25 because plaintiffs have
won one out of four recent cases).
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and .60. We would then ask for a new primary analysis.
The new primary analysis, however, would still show a probability
of less than .50 for the victory probability of the plaintiff. We
might then substitute a pair of probabilities equal to 1.00 and
0.00, and ask to see the new primary analysis.
4. Even doing all this causes the overall plaintiff victory probability
to be less than .50. We might then try 1.20 and -.20. If we then
ask for the primary analysis, the overall or averaged probabilities
are .50 and .50. That informs us that we have found the threshold
probabilities for the combustibility predictive criterion.
5. In step four, we might have easily overshot the mark by trying
1.30 and -.30. That would be indicated by the overall plaintiff
probability being higher than .50. If so, then in the next attempt
we would decrease the first value from 1.30 toward 1.00, and
increase the second from -.30 toward 0.00. Doing so would
eventually lead to the values of 1.20 and -.20.
6. Some people would consider this kind of reiterative guessing to
be rather inelegant compared to the algebraic method which leads
immediately to the correct answer. It is partly a matter of taste.
The reiterative guessing method can be done quite fast with the
P/G% program which allows one to quickly see experimental
changes. It also has the advantage of avoiding clerical errors that
are made in algebra and arithmetic. It has the further advantage
of being easier to conceptualize, and it quickly shows that the
alleged threshold values really are tie-causing.
The 1.20 value tells us that the combustibility issue would have
to generate a plaintiff victory probability of 1.20 for the overall
probability to be .50, given all the other numbers. That, in effect,
tells us that there is no way the plaintiff can win in terms of the
overall probability, by only increasing the combustibility evidence,
since no probability can be greater than 1.00. The threshold analysis
can give us a threshold probability for every cell and every weight so
we can see what combinations of changes might lead to victory for
the second-place alternative, which is the plaintiff winning. We know
that if the threshold probability in the top row under combustibility
is 1.20, then the threshold probability immediately beneath it would
have to be -.20, since the two probabilities have to add to 1.00,
although the current computer program does not contemplate this
reality. A probability of -.20 is just as impossible as a probability of
1.20. We can easily see that 1.20 makes sense because if we substitute
1.20 for the .40 which is now in that cell and add across, we then
obtain an equation of .70 + .10 + 1.20 + .40 + .30 + .30. That
equation adds to 3.00. If we then divide by six, we obtain .50. We
3.
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would also see proof if we substitute a -.20 for the .60 in the second
row and then add across, since we will then also obtain a sum of
3.00. If we think merely getting above .50 is not sufficient, we can
change the equation we were working with to (1.80 + X)/6 = .60,
rather than .50, or change the right-hand side to whatever high or
low probability we desire. This helps clarify how the idea of threshold
analysis applies to generalizing from facts by aggregating probabilities.
C.

GENERALIZING FROM FACTS TO DETERMINE DAMAGES LIKELY TO
BE AWARDED

The most common way that lawyers determine victory probabilities may be by starting with an average figure like .65 in personal
injury cases, and then asking whether the present case is above, below,
or at the average regarding the probability that the plaintiff will win.
If the lawyer decides such is an average or below average case, then
he or she has to decide roughly how much above or below .65. That
method is more crude than either predicting from cases or predicting
from facts. It does not explicitly consider prior cases, although it may
be implicitly doing so. It does not explicitly consider the factual
elements that go into determining liability, although it may implicitly
do that too.
One interesting and useful aspect of that approach is that .65
seems to be the average probability of plaintiff victory regardless of
the type of case involved. It is the average probability that the
prosecutor will win in criminal cases, according to the University of
Chicago Jury Project. 6 It is the average probability that plaintiffs will
win in personal injury cases, according to the Jury Verdict Research
Service. 7 It also represents the percentage of international law cases
that the United States wins, according to the analysis which will later
be described. The explanation why .65 is such a common victory
probability or percentage, regardless of subject matter, is:
1. If the victory probability is substantially below .50, then the
plaintiff is not so likely to go to trial, but will be willing to settle
or to withdraw.
2. If the victory probability is substantially above .75, then the
defendant is not so likely to go to trial, but will be willing to
settle.
6. H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEmsEL, Tim AMEucAN JURY (1966). Out of a nationwide random sample of 3,576 trials, there were 64.2% convictions, 30.3% acquittals,
and 5.5% hung juries.
7. VERDICT EXPECTANCIES (Jury Verdict Research, Inc., since 1960) and VALUATION HANDBOOK (Jury Verdict Research, Inc., since 1960).
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3.

If the victory probability is between .50 and .75, then the case is
more likely to go to trial. A typical case in that set is likely to
have a .65 victory probability.
Likewise, the most common way of predicting damages is through
various rules of thumb like multiplying the "specials" by five, ten,
or some other figure, depending upon the factual circumstances and
the attorney involved. The specials consist of the out-of-pocket medical expenses and the lost wages. Thus, if the out-of-pocket medical
expenses are $2,000, the lost wages are $8,000 and the multiplier is
considered to be five, then the predicted damages would be $50,000
if the case is won. This method is also more crude than predicting
from prior cases, although the multiplier may be implicitly based on
prior cases. It is also more crude than predicting from specific facts
which may include more relevant items than just the specials.
When one systematically predicts damages from prior cases, the
most common approach may be to average the damages from similar
cases. Thus, suppose one knows of two similar cases. One plaintiff
was awarded $40,000 in damages, and the other was awarded $30,000.
One might then predict the damages in the case at hand will be
$35,000. That approach has the defect of relying on a small or large
.sample that may be unrepresentative. It is also defective in that the
concept of "similar cases" may be highly subjective. In addition, it
does not explicitly consider any facts that go into determining damages, although it may be implicitly saying something about what facts
are relevant in how it defines or determines similarity.
As for a higher step in the quantitative prediction of damages,
one can do a statistical regression analysis 8 like that based on prior
cases. The big drawback to doing so is that one is dependent on prior
cases that have occurred and especially on the variables that can be
measured as having occurred within those prior cases. That may
exclude important variables that are present in the case at hand which
do not occur very often or which are difficult to quantitatively measure
when they do occur. That is where predicting or generalizing from
facts has an advantage, since such method is not dependent on what
factors are involved in the prior cases or what is conveniently measurable.
Table 3 provides an illustration of generalizing from facts in
order to determine the damages that are likely to be awarded. The
8. D. VINSON & P. ANTHONY, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS FOR LITIGATION (1985); D. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FuNDAmENTALS OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE, (1983); and J. LOEWEN, SoCIAL SCIENCE IN THE COURmTOOM: STATISTICAL
TECHNIQUES AND RESEARCH METHODS FOR WINNING CLASS-ACTION SUITs (1982).
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left side of section A shows alternative damage amounts for the case
concerning the United States insurance company and the foreign
electronics manufacturer. Seven rows of alternatives are listed. The
first alternative is from $600,000 to $700,000, and so on to the fifth
alternative which is "Over $1,000,000." The sixth row is blank. The
seventh row refers to damages without providing for intervals. It is
only the seventh alternative in which we are interested in this context.
TABLE 3. DETERMINING DAMAGES LIKELY TO BE AWARDED

A.

THE DAMAGES ALTERNATIVES AND THE PREDICTIVE CRITERIA
Alternative

Criterion

Meas. Unit

1 $600,000
2 $700,000
3 $800,000
4 $900,000
5 $1,000,000
6
7 DAMAGES

1 P'S LOW PRED.
2 P'S HIGH PRED.
3 P'S MOST LIKELY
4 D'S LOW PRED.
5 D'S HIGH PRED.
6 D'S MOST LIKELY

$1,000'S
$1,000'S
"
'

Weight
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
2.00

B. SCORES OF THE KEY ALTERNATIVE ON THE CRITERIA

DAMAGES
C.

P'S LOW
600.00

ALTERNATIVE / CRITERIA SCORING
D'S HIGH
D'S LOW
P'S MOST
P'S HIGH
900.00
600.00
750.00
950.00

THE OVERALL OR AGGREGATE SCORE OF THE KEY ALTERNATIVE
Combined Rawscores
Alternative
6050.00
7 DAMAGES

D'S MOST
750.00

070
100.00

The right side of section A shows the predictive criteria with
which the mediator was actually working in this case. The predictive
criteria did not include medical expenses or lost wages since this was
a property damage case. The main damages involved a burned-out
restaurant and some burned-out offices. This illustrates that a rule of
thumb for predicting damages based on medical specials and lost
wages would not have much applicability in this relatively common
type of property damage case. The most important predictive criteria
were considered to be the estimates of the knowledgeable lawyers on
both sides of the case. They were not only knowledgeable in the sense
of being specialists in product liability cases, including appliance-fire
cases, but they were also knowledgeable about the facts of this specific
case. The mediator discussed the likely damages with the lawyers
separately, together with each other, and together with their clients.
From these discussions one could roughly determine: (1) the plaintiff's
lowest prediction as to the damages likely to be awarded if the plaintiff
won; (2) the plaintiff's highest prediction; (3) the plaintiff's most
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likely prediction; (4) the defendant's lowest prediction; (5) the defendant's highest prediction; and (6) the defendant's most likely prediction. The measurement-unit column shows that these predictions are
measured in $1,000 units to keep the numbers small and manageable.
The weight column shows that extra weight is logically given to the
plaintiff's and defendant's most likely predictions, rather than to their
lowest or highest predictions. We could also adjust the weights for
the relative credibility of each side if one side seemed to be perceiving
the damages more accurately than the other side, possibly based on
more experience or inside information. In this case, there was no
reason for giving more weight to one side than the other.
Section B of Table 3 shows how the key alternative of "Damages"
scored on each of the six criteria. The plaintiff's lowest prediction
was about $600,000, and the highest was about $950,000. The plaintiff's most likely prediction was about $750,000. The most likely
prediction, however, is not necessarily the midpoint between the lowest
and the highest. A person can estimate that somebody could be as
young as twenty and as old as fifty, but is probably thirty. The
defendant's lowest prediction was about $600,000 and the highest
about $900,000, with the most likely prediction also at $750,000. One
might wonder why the plaintiff's and defendant's predictions were so
close here when they were so far apart regarding the victory probabilities. The answer is that victory probabilities are much more
subjective. That was especially so in this case where the insurance
company had already made payments to the injured parties. Those
payments thus constituted liquidated damages, and thereby reduced
some of the subjectivity which otherwise would have been present if
the plaintiff insurance company were still arguing with the injured
parties over the amount of property damage they had suffered.
Section C of Table 3 provides an overall figure by summing eight
separate figures. The eight figures come from the six basic figures
shown in section B plus counting the plaintiff's and defendant's most
likely predictions twice, since both those criteria are given weights of
two. The sum of those eight figures is $6,050,000. That figure is then
divided by eight, which is the sum of the weights, to arrive at an
overall prediction of $756,250. That is the figure with which the
mediator worked in seeking to bring about a fair settlement. The
settlement involved considering more than just the damages. It also
involved taking into consideration the possibility of the electronics
manufacturer giving computers to the insurance company for use by
its agents, television sets as sales bonuses, and also claims against
United States citizens which the manufacturer's foreign insurance
company was willing to forego pursuing. In seeking a settlement, the
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mediator tended to emphasize the plaintiff's lowest prediction when
dealing with the plaintiff, and the defendant's highest prediction when
dealing with the defendant.
III.

AN INTERNATIONAL LAW CASE

WITH

MULTIPLE FACTS

AND

WEIGHTS

One can now combine what has previously been developed on
predicting from cases and predicting from facts to obtain the benefits
of both approaches. Table 4 provides such an illustration. It contains
data from a set of 137 cases, obtained from leading international law
case books, in which the United States was a party. The object here
is to use those cases to develop a set of probabilities that can be
aggregated to predict future cases which have various combinations
of characteristics. The alternative positions in the past or future cases
are that the United States either wins or loses.
TABLE 4. GENERALIZING A VICTORY PROBABILITY FROM FACTUAL ELEMENTS IN CASES

Variables, Weights, and Categories
(Arranged in rank order)

Percent of
Quantity of Cases Won by
U.S. in
Cases in
Category
Category

I. Main Source of Law

a) U.S. domestic law ....................................................................

b) International law and custom .....................................................
c) Treaty ...................................................................................
d) Domestic law of other country ...................................................
3. Main Subject Matter and U.S. Position
a) National territory and U.S. seeking change ..................................
b) National territory and U.S. seeking status quo ..............................
c) Jurisdiction and U.S. seeking it ..................................................
d) Hostilities between countries and U.S. repelling interference ...........
e) Diplomatic or consular intercourse and U.S. seeking redress ............
.0 Individual in international law and U.S. seeking curtailment of his
rights (e.g., deportation and alien rights) ......................................
g) Responsibility of other country asserted by U.S. generally for
dam ages .................................................................................
h) Individual in international law and U.S. seeking to expand or maintain
his rights (e.g., U.S. representing citizen in suit) ............................
i) Treaty and U.S. seeking broad definition ......................................
j) Diplomatic and consular intercourse and redress sought from U.S.....
k) Responsibility of U.S. asserted generally for damages .....................
1) Treaty and U.S. seeking narrow definition ....................................
m) Hostilities between countries and U.S. seeking to interfere or obtain
reparations ............................................................................
3. Decision-Making Tribunal
a) U.S. Supreme Court .................................................................
b) Lower federal court .................................................................
c) Ad hoc tribunals ........................................
d) British court .......................................................................
e) Non-British foreign court ..........................................................
f) Hague ..........................................
4. Economic Interests and U.S. Position

26

65

17

65
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a) U.S. liberal in antitrust cases .................................. 1..................
9
100
b) U.S. liberal in debtor-creditor cases ............................................
3
100
c) U.S. conservative in business v. labor cases ..................................
1
100
d) No economic interests involved or U.S. position neutral .................
119
61
e) U.S. conservative in debtor-creditor cases .....................................
5
60
5. Civil Liberty Interests and U.S. Position (e= .23, k= .38)
a) U.S. liberal in noncriminal procedure matters ...............................
4
100
b) U.S. liberal in criminal procedure ...............................................
6
83
c) U.S. conservative in noncriminal procedure matters ........................
10
80
d) No civil liberty interest involved or U.S. position neutral ................
99
65
e) U.S. conservative in criminal procedure .......................................
16
44
6. Industrial Power of U.S. Opponent
a) Sam e .....................................................................................
6
100
b) N ot countries ..........................................................................
70
70
c) Less ......................................................................................
66
56
7. Nature of Plaintiff
a) State in U .S ............................................................................
1
100
b) A lien in U.S...........................................................................
10
80
c) Resident of foreign country .......................................................
11
73
d) U .S. itself ..............................................................................
75
68
e) U.S. citizen ............................................................................
14
57
J) Business firm ..........................................................................
18
50
g) Other country .........................................................................
8
50

A.

THE CONTENTS OF AN EMPIRICAL PROBABILITIES TABLE

Table 4 works with seven predictive criteria. They include:
1. The main source of law. It could either be United States domestic
law, international law or custom, a treaty, or the domestic law
of another country.
2. The main subject matter. It could involve national territory,
jurisdiction, hostilities between countries, diplomatic interaction,
individuals in international law, treaty interpretations, responsibilities of the United States, or the responsibilities of other
countries. This predictive criterion contains fourteen sub-categories based on various subject matters and what the United
States position is for or against.
3. The decision-making tribunal. It could be the United States
Supreme Court, a lower federal court, an ad hoc tribunal, a
British court, a non-British foreign court, or the Hague. Under
each predictive criterion, the sub-categories are arranged in order
of the frequency of the cases that are found in those subcategories in the sample of 137 cases.
4. The economic interests. This could relate to anti-trust, debtorcreditor, business-labor, or no economic interest. The United
States position is also coded in these sub-categories, which could
be either liberal or conservative.
5. The civil liberties interest. It could relate to non-criminal procedure or criminal procedure. The United States position can
either be liberal or conservative in these cases as well.
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The industrialpower of the United States opponent. This could
be about the same as the United States, or less, or not a country.
7. The nature of the plaintiff. It could be a United States state, a
United States alien, a resident of a foreign country, the United
States itself, a United States citizen, a business firm, or another
country.
Table 4 is basically the same kind of table for aggregating
probabilities as is Table 2, section B, although at first glance they
do not look alike. Table 2, section B, shows its five predictive
criteria on the columns. Table 4 has forty-three predictive criteria
arranged in seven groups. The first group refers to the source of law
and includes four predictive criteria. The second group refers to the
main subject matter and the United States position, and it includes
thirteen predictive criteria. The third through seventh groups contain
twenty-six predictive criteria among those groups. That adds to fortythree predictive criteria, which would be too much to show on the
columns of an 8 1/2 by 11 sheet, but not too much to show on the
rows.
Table 2, section B, has two rows. The top row shows the
probability of the plaintiff winning, and the bottom row shows the
probability of the defendant winning for each criterion. Table 3
combines those two rows into one column, labelled as percent of
cases won by the United States in the category or criterion to the
left. To determine the probability or percent of the cases lost by the
United States in the category to the left, simply subtract the percentage shown from 100%0. Thus, the first percentage indicates that
the United States won eighty-five percent of the cases that involved
United States domestic law, and therefore lost fifteen percent. That
is the same as saying the United States has a probability of .85 of
winning in the United States domestic law cases, and a .15 probability
of losing.
A column is also included in Table 3 showing the quantity of
cases in each category. Thus the eighty-five percent in the top row
translates into forty-three cases won out of the fifty-three that
involved United States domestic law, and the fifteen percent translates into eight cases lost. There is no such column showing the
quantity of cases in Table 2, section B. The reason is that the
probabilities in Table 2, section B, are what might be called impressionistic probabilities. They are not based on any specific cases, but
on a general impression that, for example, given the facts offered
on combustibility, the plaintiff seems to have about a .40 probability
of winning. The probabilities or percentages in the international law
table are sometimes referred to as Fmpirical probabilities because
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they are based on actual prior cases. That is unfortunate terminology, because the so-called impressionistic probabilities are likely to
also be based on prior empirical or observable experience. They may
be even more valid (depending on whose observations are involved)
than the small sample sizes and subjective category-definitions that
are associated with the international law probabilities. On the other
hand, the empirical probabilities of Table 4 could be more valid.
The validity in predicting case outcomes depends on (1) how powerful
the chosen predictors are in either situation, (2) how perceptive the
person or group is who is scoring the impressionistic probabilities,
and (3) how representative the samples of cases are from which the
empirical probabilities come.
There is an important difference between Table 2 on predicting
the probability of victory in the product liability case, and Table 4
on doing likewise in the international dispute cases. Table 2 is
constructed in such a way that all the predictive criteria apply to the
case at hand, because the table was constructed specifically for
predicting that case. Most of the forty-three predictive criteria in
Table 4 are not likely to be applicable to any given international law
case. In fact, only seven of the forty-three categories are likely to
be applicable because the categories within each group are mutually
exclusive. It does not have to be that way. One could develop a list
of groups in which more than one category could apply to a given
case. The mutual exclusivity of these lists, within each group, reflects
one of the constraints of working with traditional survey research
and mainframe computers for which this data was originally developed.
B.

APPLYING AN EMPIRICAL PROBABILITIES TABLE

To apply Table 4 to a specific case that is to be decided or that
has already been decided, one first determines what seven categories
apply to the case. One then adds the seven probabilities that are
associated with those categories and divides by seven when the
predictive criteria are considered equally important. One can, however, weight the predictive criteria in terms of their relative importance, and then sum the products of the weights and the probabilities,
rather than add the probabilities alone. One would then divide by
the sum of the weights in order to obtain an overall weighted
probability.
As a concrete example, let us consider the L.G. Farben case. 9
The case involved a creditor of the LG. Farben Company who
9. 45 Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung 341 (1949).
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brought suit in Switzerland to stop the confiscation of the I.G.
Farben Swiss assets by the United States and the Allied Powers,
unless payments were first made to the legitimate creditors of the
I.G. Farben Company. In terms of the seven variables in Table 4,
the case involved:
1. The domestic law of another country, namely Switzerland. The
United States wins about twenty-five percent of such cases,
although the sample size is only four cases in which the domestic
law of another country was involved.
2. The United States seeking reparations. The United States victory
probability in such cases is zero percent. One should, however,
note that we are not basing the overall prediction on any one
criterion. We could also weight the criteria on the basis of the
sample size for each criterion on the theory that the bigger the
sample size the more reliable is the predictor up to a sample size
of about thirty.
3. A non-British foreign court, in which the United States won .33
of the three past cases. There were not enough Swiss cases to
warrant a special category. We know, however, that one of three
cases is a Swiss case, since the L G. Farben case is part of the
larger sample of 137 cases.
4. Economic interests between a debtor and a creditor. The debtor
was the I.G. Farben Company, which was not a litigant in the
case. The creditor was the plaintiff. The United States was the
defendant, but the United States was not defending the I.G.
Farben Company. The United States was seeking to take the
assets away from both the creditor and the I.G. Farben Company
and give them to people who were slave laborers of the I.G.
Farben Company, or give them away to be used as part of the
general reparations of Nazi Germany to the Allied Powers. The
United States was thus neutral between the creditor and the
debtor, since the United States was taking a position contrary
to both of them. That category involves a .61 probability of
victory.
5. No civil liberty interests, such as freedom of speech, equal
protection under the law, or fair criminal procedure. In the
ninety-nine cases like that, the United States wins sixty-five
percent of the time and loses thirty-five percent of the time.
6. The relative industrial power of the United States opponent. The
data tends to indicate that the United States does better when
its opponent is an industrialized country like the United States,
rather than a less developed country. The explanation might be
that international law may favor weaker countries who are not
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so likely to win on the battlefield or in other forms of international interaction. That is like the fact that minority groups do
better before the United States Supreme Court than they do on
the battlefield of a mob scene or before a legislature. In the L G.
Farben case, the United States opponent was a non-country.
This was an international law case involving a lot of countries,
but no country was a plaintiff. In such cases, the United States
wins seventy percent of the time.
7. Seven categories regarding the nature of the plaintiff. In this
case, the plaintiff was a resident of a foreign country. The eleven
cases of that type resulted in a victory probability for the United
States of .73.
If we add the seven probabilities, we obtain a sum of 3.27. If
we divide that sum by seven, we obtain an overall average probability
of .47. Since that number is closer to a probability of 0.00 than to
a probability of 1.00, we would predict that the United States was
more likely to lose this case than to win. That is what did happen
in the L.G. Farben case. We can improve upon that predictive
analysis by taking into consideration the fact that the seven predictive
criteria are not all equally important. This set of predictive criteria,
like many sets in predicting law cases, can be divided into four
general types of predictors. Those predictors in order of importance
are:
1. The nature of the law. This is covered by the first criterion.
2. The nature of the facts. This is covered by the second criterion.
3. The nature of the decision-makers. This is covered by the third
criterion.
4. The nature of the litigants. This is covered by criteria four
through seven.
If we give these criteria weights of 4, 3, 2 and 1, respectively,
then the summation score for the .G. Farben case would be (4)(.25)
+ (3)(0) + (2)(.33) + (1)(.61) + (1)(.65) + (1)(.70) + (1)(.73). The
sum of these products is 4.36. If we divide that figure by the sum
of the weights, which is thirteen, then we obtain an overall probability of .34. That is closer to the figure of 0.00 which represents a
loss in the case for the United States. If, instead of using those
weights that are based on a knowledge of the subject matter, we use
weights based on a mechanistic regression analysis, then the seven
weights are 3.50, 3.00, 2.70, 2.40, 2.30, 2.10, and 1.90. Using those
seven weights or multipliers, we get a new overall sum of 7.58. If
we divide that sum by the sum of the weights, which is 17.90, we
obtain an overall probability of .42. This is further away from the

1989:369]

GENERALIZING FROM FACTS

0.00 figure than the .34 obtained using the common sense weights. 10
IV.

COMPARING Two PREDICTIVE APPROACHES

The essence of generalizing from facts in terms of spreadsheet
perspective is that:
1. On the rows are the alternative positions which the court could
take; such as, victory for the plaintiff on the first row, and
victory for the defendant on the second row. Victory generally
refers to the case as a whole, but could refer to any specific
issues.
2. On the columns are the predictive criteria. They can be any
factual elements which may be relevant to the court's decision,
regardless whether they have occurred in previous cases.
3. The relations involve inserting probabilities into each column so
the sum of probabilities add to 1.00. For example, on the first
criterion, one notes the probability of the plaintiff winning on
this fact element alone is .40. That means the probability of the
defendant winning on this fact element alone has to be .60.
4. One then sums across the probabilities on each row, and divides
by the number of predictive criteria. For example, suppose there
are two predictive criteria and the plaintiff victory probability
is .40 in light of the first criterion, and .50 in light of the second.
The plaintiff's overall victory probability is about .45, or .90
divided by two. This assumes each criterion is equally important.
If they are not equally important, then one calculates a weighted
average taking the relative importance of the criteria into consideration.
The essence of generalizing from cases (rather than facts) in
terms of a spreadsheet perspective is that:
1. On the rows are cases, casetypes, or both.
2. The predictive criteria tend to be characteristics of the cases
which can be determined by reading the cases or by reading
background materials that are related to the cases.
10. For further details concerning the analysis of the international dispute cases,
see "Empirical Probability Tables: International Dispute Cases" in S. NAGEL, Tha LEGAL
PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTWE 157-72 (1969); M. GOODMAN, UNITED STATES
AS A PARTY ININTERNATIONAL LAW DispuEs (1964) (Bachelor's Thesis) (available in the
University of Illinois Law Library). The unweighted summation method is related to the
prediction system used by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck for predicting delinquency and
other forms of criminal behavior. S. GLUECK & E. GLuECK, PREDICTING DELINQUENCY
AND CRIME 18-32 (1959).
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With actual cases, the relations usually involve scoring the cases
by reading the court opinions or court records. With casetypes
that are not actual cages, the relations involve deducing scores
from observing how other related cases which have different
facts have been handled, and then reasoning by analogy or
through afortiori reasoning. The relations tend to be scored on
a 1-5, 1-3, or 1-2 scale.
4. One can add across each case in order to obtain an overall score
for each case. One can then observe what overall scores are
associated with a victory for the plaintiff and which ones with
a victory for the defendant.
Either approach can generate probabilities as an end product,
although the approach of generalizing from facts by aggregating
probabilities is more direct. The way generalizing from cases works
is by noting the percent of the cases that the plaintiff won, which
had summation scores of 6, 7, and so on, across the range of
summation scores received. Likewise, either approach can generate
if-then statements as an end product. When predicting from cases,
the statements tend to take the form, "if the summation score is 9
or greater, then the plaintiff will win." When predicting from facts,
the statement tends to take the form, "if the probability is .40 on
the first variable and .50 on the second variable, then the overall
probability will be about .45."
Either approach can generate an equation as one of its end
products or as a way of expressing a decision rule. When predicting
from cases, the equation tends to take the form Y = A + BX. In
such an equation, Y is the outcome to be predicted, X is the
summation score of the case at hand, A is the value of Y when X is
zero, and B is the increase in Y when X increases by one unit. When
predicting from facts, the equation tends to take the form Y =
(WIXI + W2X 2)/N. In such an equation, Y is the outcome to be
predicted, W is the relative weight of each predictive criterion, X is
the separate victory probability associated with each predictive criterion, and N is the number of predictive criteria, or the sum of
their weights, which in this example is two.
The great advantage of predicting from cases is that such method
more explicitly draws on prior precedents, although the probabilities
in generalizing from facts can also come from prior cases. The great
advantage of predicting from facts is that this method frees one
from the constraint of having to work with a limited sample of prior
cases, although one can do some deducing as to what would have
happened in various casetypes for which there are no prior cases
available.
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One can combine the two approaches by doing the same field
of law in both ways, but separately. One can also combine the
approaches by working with a set of cases to generate probabilities
for facts or predictive criteria. The probabilities can then be averaged
for the case at hand, as was done with the international law case.
Either predicting from cases or from facts can be combined with
legal retrieval systems like the LEXIS® service" or Westlaw® .12
Those systems can generate cases. What both systems currently lack
is any provision for systematically processing the cases which they
retrieve. A large step in the direction of enabling cases to be more
systematically processed would be to note within the data base for
each case whether the plaintiff or the defendant won. Doing so can
help provide the outcome column when predicting from cases. It can
also provide useful information for calculating the probabilities of
victory when predicting from facts.
Perhaps the most important point is that both methods of
predicting from cases or facts using the P/G% system, or a related
spreadsheet-based system, are simple and valid enough for lawyers
to use without any technical training in statistics or mathematical
probability. Both methods reflect a kind of common sense among
lawyers regarding how case outcomes are to be predicted. In that
sense, P/G0 prediction (like P/G070 choosing and allocating) seeks
to reflect what good decision-makers implicitly do. 3
V.

CONCLUSION

These methods are alternatives to telling lawyers what statisticians or mathematicians think they ought to do, as if they were
operating in a world in which there are only algebraic symbols,
hypothetical numbers, or complete information on all variables and
11. LEXIS is a registered trademark for information products and services of
Mead Data Central, Inc.
12. WESTLAW ® is a registered trademark of West Publishing Company, Inc.
For details on computer retrieval systems, see P. MAoGs & J. SPROWL, COMPUTER

(1987).
13. To obtain a copy of the P/G01o decision-aiding software program, write to
Decision Aids, Inc., 1720 Parkhaven Drive, Champaign, Illinois, 61820. The basic
software package includes the program, a book entitled TEACH YOURSELF DECISioNAmINO Son'WARE, and ten data files corresponding to the illustrative examples in the
book. Both the program and the data files are on a floppy disk for running on IBM
compatible microcomputers. The book is available in hard copy or on a floppy disk.
Other books are also available for specialized applications or more advanced legal
applications of the software.
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cases. We need predictive methods for operating in the real world
of multi-dimensionality and limited information, to make predictions
that relate to important decisions, as in generalizing from facts in
4
predicting court cases.

14. On systematic synthesizing of facts in trial decisions, see J. FRANK, COURTS
AND REAIUTy n4 AMERICAN JUSTICE (1950); Nagel, Lamm & Neef,
Decision Theory and Juror Decisonmaking in THE TRUAL PROCESS 1353 (B. Sales ed.
1981); and N. KEa & R. BRAY (eds.), THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM (1982).
Relevant software for calculating probabilities includes the Bayesian probabilities program in the package called "Computer Models for Management Science," AddisonWesley, Reading, Massachusetts.
ON TsRU: MyT
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APPENDIX
PREDICTION WITH OVERLAPPING VARIABLES

A problem that can be tricky in judical prediction is how to
deal with overlapping variables. For example, suppose one witness
says that he saw the defendant at the scene of the crime. If that
were our only evidence, the probability of the defendant being guilty
might only be .60. If, however, there is a second witness who also
says he saw the defendant at the scene of the crime, than the
probability of the defendant being guilty should now be higher than
.60, even if the second witness alone generates a probability of only
.50.
In other words, the second witness tends to reinforce the first
witness, causing the combined probability to be higher than the
probability of either witness alone. There is, however, diminishing
returns from the second witness regardless which witness is second,
since the combined probability is not 1.10. The diminishing returns
is less if the stronger witness goes second, but still occurs. Thus if
the stronger witness goes first, then the probability moves from .60
to about .65 after the weaker witness is heard. If, however, the
weaker witness goes first, than the probability moves from .50 to
.65 after the stronger witness is heard.
The problem is how to handle such a pair of variables using the
averaging methods of this article. If the two probabilities are averaged, then the combined probability is .55. That does not make
sense, since it is less than the probability of the .60 witness alone.
That kind of averaging gives the appearance that the second witness
does more harm than good by lowering the overall probability.
The problem cannot be meaningfully handled by giving a lower
weight to the second witness when the first witness gets a weight of
1.00. A lower weight of .80, for example, would cause the combined
weighted average to be .50 which implies the second witness has
even more of a negative effect than working with equal weights for
both witnesses. A higher weight for the second witness like 1.50
would result in a combined weight of .675 which makes more sense
in terms of the result, but the weight of 1.50 for the less important
witness makes no sense.
The best way to deal with two overlapping variables or predictive
factors is to treat them as a single combined or holistic factor to
begin with. One then asks what is the probability of the defendant
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being found guilty given there are two witnesses who saw the
defendant at the scene of the crime.
One might ask why not combine all the predictive factors
together, and just give one overall probability, rather than any
separate probabilities. The answer is because we want to be able to
do a sensitivity analysis on as many of the factors as possible. That
analysis determines how much their separate probabilities would
have to change in order to reverse the overall probability. A reversal
of a guilt probability means going above or below the .90 threshold.
A reversal of a liability probability means going above or below the
.50 threshold.
We thus compromise between the purely holistic approach and
the itemized approach. We do some holistic combinations, but
generally prefer to itemize or disaggregate the predictive factors.

